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Abstract
In early 2009, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Liberia (TRC) re-leased the first volume of its final report. The report claims that the root causes of the civil war that devastated Liberia between 1989 and 2003 were poverty, 
corruption, and inequality. Despite this diagnosis, the Commission’s legal analysis of 
past abuses barely touches upon violations of economic, social, and cultural rights 
(ESCR). Likewise, many transitional justice processes around the world sideline con-
siderations of ESCR. This article, based on an analysis of the first volume of the final 
report of the TRC of Liberia, outlines why violations of ESCR should be addressed by 
transitional justice processes. This paper also provides recommendations for the final 
two volumes of the report, to be issued in June 2009.
Introduction 
After the establishment of a comprehensive peace agreement in 2003, Liberia creat-
ed the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) to investigate abuses committed 
during the country’s civil war. The Commission addressed abuses committed between 
1979, the year before the 1980 coup by former president Samuel Doe, and October 
2003, the year when the transitional government was installed. In early 2009, the 
Commission released the first volume of its findings,1 which established that the princi-
pal causes of the war were economic, social, and cultural rights (ESCR) violations, such 
as the forcible destruction of homes and the loss of livelihoods. Other ESCR violations 
included discriminative land practices, and unequal access to education or healthcare. 
However, there is a significant gap between the Liberian Commission’s findings on the 
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causes of the conflict and its legal analysis of abuses committed. Moreover, an analysis 
of the Commission’s preliminary report reveals that the TRC’s diagnosis of the social 
and economic causes of the conflict has not yet led to the development of appropriate 
remedies. 
The purpose of this article is to outline why vio-
lations of ESCR should be addressed by transitional 
justice processes. Addressing violations of ESCR in 
transitional justice underscores the idea that all hu-
man rights are interrelated and equally important. 
In addition, including ESCR in post-conflict justice 
has the potential to significantly enhance human 
security after the conflict. Continuing violations 
of ESCR may exacerbate tensions, lead to renewed 
conflict, and result in further violations of civil and 
political rights. Simultaneously, addressing ESCR 
violations would create opportunities to confront leaders who profit from a conflict by 
depriving others of economic resources. In the past, elites have often used their assets 
gained through enrichment and exploitation to shield themselves from accountability, 
reinforcing their impunity. Further, systematic discrimination and inequality vis-à-vis 
access to resources, land, work, or housing also have a gender dimension which is over-
looked if transitional justice focuses only on civil and political rights. As an example, in 
countries such as Liberia, women face greater difficulties in accessing land tenure. If a 
transitional justice mechanism investigates violations of civil and political rights, it will 
deal with the husband’s abduction or death, but it is likely to fail to support the female 
spouse who may have subsequently lost her and her family’s means of subsistence.
Incorporating the full range of abuses would provide a more truthful account of 
the conflict and would reveal underlying gender dimensions. Such a holistic approach 
would be more likely to facilitate the debate on how to sustainably redress the complex 
and interrelated human rights violations of the past, and to prevent their recurrence. 
As this article argues, transitional justice strategies have only marginally dealt with 
ESCR. While the TRC of Liberia was given an innovative and broad mandate to address 
all gross human rights violations, violations of international humanitarian law, and 
economic crimes, the Commission’s first volume of the final report does not address 
ESCR sufficiently in its legal analysis and recommendations. The remaining volumes 
of the TRC report, due in June 2009, should analyze violations of ESCR in more detail. 
The final report should also make specific recommendations to address ESCR viola-
tions in order to undergird the ongoing Liberian transitional justice process. 
Civil and Political Rights—The Only “Real” Human Rights?
The marginalization of ESCR in transitional justice reflects an old ideological dichoto-
my in human rights discourse between civil and political rights and ESCR. This sepa-
ration is still apparent in transitional justice discourse and practice. Louise Arbour, 
Including ESCR in 
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the former UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, has convincingly made the di-
agnosis that “old misconceptions die hard”2 when it comes to the determination of 
which human rights abuses a transitional justice mechanism should address. While 
torture, persecution, and arbitrary detention are undisputed human rights violations, 
governments, donor agencies, and practitioners often still view ESCR in a fundamen-
tally different manner. ESCR are often seen as aspirational policy goals instead of legal 
entitlements.3 
Contemporary international human rights law 
defines ESCR as those human rights that relate to 
the conditions necessary to meet basic needs such 
as food, water, housing, education, and healthcare. 
ESCR are contained within the Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights, a range of international trea-
ties, and international customary law. The widely 
ratified International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) includes the rights to 
education, adequate housing, food, work, the highest 
attainable standard of health, as well as the cultural 
rights of minorities and indigenous peoples.4 Dur-
ing times of armed conflict–including periods when 
the violence in Liberia exceeded the threshold for an 
armed conflict5–international humanitarian law, in 
addition to human rights law, specifically protects 
basic ESCR. For instance, humanitarian law pro-
hibits the destruction of objects indispensable to the 
survival of the civilian population, such as foodstuffs 
or drinking water installations.6 
While the Universal Declaration of Human Rights considers all human rights 
equally, Cold War oppositions influenced the negotiations of the two UN Human Rights 
Covenants. Most Socialist states were unenthusiastic about civil and political rights 
(such as the right of assembly and the freedom of speech), while most Western States 
were resistant to the concept of economic and social rights as legal entitlements. The 
separation of human rights into two Covenants during the Cold War (the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the ICESCR) has nurtured perceptions that 
only civil and political rights are justiciable and “real” human rights, especially among 
Western States and Western human rights organizations.7 As a sign of this dichotomy, 
the Reagan Administration ceased to mention social and economic rights in the State 
Department’s annual human rights reports.8 
After the Cold War, an increasing number of human rights groups argued that the 
protection of certain rights in isolation was insufficient.9 Kofi Annan, the UN secretary-
general at the time, echoed the sentiment of many human rights advocates from the 
Global South, stating “the right to vote is worth little if their children are hungry and 
Contemporary 
international 
human rights law 
defines ESCR as 
those human rights 
that relate to 
the conditions 
necessary to meet 
basic needs such 
as food, water, 
housing, education, 
and healthcare.
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do not have access to safe water.”10 The Vienna World Conference on Human Rights in 
1993 famously acknowledged that “[a]ll human rights are universal, indivisible and in-
terdependent and interrelated. The international community must treat human rights 
globally in a fair and equal manner, on the same footing, and with the same empha-
sis.”11 Despite this declaration, the problems associated with the dichotomy between 
civil and political rights and ESCR persist. Transitional justice is one of the areas in 
which the ramifications of the old dichotomy can still be felt today. While the rhetoric 
of the indivisibility of rights has entered the transnational justice discourse, the signifi-
cance of taking all human rights into account remains largely unexplored. As a result, 
transitional justice continues to marginalize ESCR.
Transitional Justice Sidelines ESCR
As a response to widespread violations of human rights and of international humanitar-
ian law, transitional justice is often perceived as a crucial component of peacebuilding, 
post-conflict human rights work, and reconciliation. Transitional justice commonly 
pursues goals such as establishing the truth, providing reparations for harm suffered, 
restoring the victim’s dignity, ensuring that perpetrators are held accountable, facili-
tating national reconciliation and a common understanding of the past, legitimizing 
state institutions, and preventing future abuses.
The prevailing model of transitional justice is based on the assumption that mech-
anisms such as truth commissions, trials, reparations, and vetting programs should 
primarily address civil and political rights violations relating to personal freedoms 
and physical integrity.12 Historically, transitional justice mechanisms such as criminal 
prosecutions, truth commissions, reparations, or institutional reform programs have 
mostly dealt with torture, killings, arbitrary detention, and “disappearances,” leaving 
violations of ESCR unaddressed in all but rare instances. Alexander Boraine, former 
deputy chair of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, advocates for 
“a deeper, richer and broader vision of justice which seeks to confront perpetrators, 
address the needs of victims and assist in the start of a process of reconciliation and 
transformation.”13 As is the case in Liberia, this “deeper vision” is necessary because 
victims’ needs are related to violations of ESCR as much as they are related to viola-
tions of civil and political rights.14 However, the transitional justice movement has had 
a narrow view of what constitutes human rights violations; it must recognize the fact 
that ESCR are not only part of existing international law but are, moreover, a decisive 
dimension of the past abuses to be addressed. 
The Liberian truth commission is among the first to have an explicit mandate to 
focus on all gross human rights violations, violations of international humanitarian 
law, and economic crimes. Despite the broadness of the TRC’s mandate, the first vol-
ume of its final report issued in December 2008 is almost silent on violations of ESCR. 
Before outlining the context in which the commission issued its preliminary report, 
two limitations of this article should be mentioned. First, the article only discusses the 
TRC’s first volume of the final report. Therefore, this article does not analyze all other 
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manifold activities conducted by the Truth Commission nor can it foresee the content 
of the last two volumes of the final report.15 Moreover, since the two remaining volumes 
have not yet been released, it is entirely possible, indeed desirable, that an analysis of 
the consolidated report would come to different conclusions. Second, it is important 
to note that this article examines the first volume of the final report as it was posted to 
the Commission’s website on January 24, 2009. The Commission’s preliminary report 
generated controversy when it was released in late January, with four commissioners 
publicly disowning it in a letter to the president.16 In mid-February, the report was 
quietly removed from the TRC’s website, officially for “administrative reasons.”17 This 
article is thus limited to an analysis of how Volume I–as distributed on January 24, 
2009–addresses violations of ESCR committed during Liberia’s violent past.
From Armed Conflict to Truth Commission
Fourteen Years of Conflict
Violent conflict devastated Liberia between 1989 and 2003. During this time, approxi-
mately 200,000 people lost their lives, one million were displaced, and 60-70% of the 
population suffered some form of sexual violence.18 After the Special Court for Sierra 
Leone indicted Charles Taylor, the former Liberian President and warlord, a compre-
hensive peace agreement was signed in Accra in the summer of 2003. A transitional 
government was established in October 2003. The Accra agreement called for the es-
tablishment of an independent national commission on human rights, and the cre-
ation of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Additionally, the Accra agreement 
recommended reform of the Liberian police force and reorganization of the National 
Elections Commission. In early 2006, Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf was inaugurated as the 
first elected female president on the African continent. Since her election, there have 
been efforts to restore basic services such as running water and electricity. Johnson-
Sirleaf has also created initiatives to combat sexual violence. However, crime remains 
rampant,19 and challenges to peace include weak economic governance, shaky results 
in the security sector, and a fragile judiciary.20 
The signing of the comprehensive peace agreement in August 2003 and the pas-
sage of the Truth and Reconciliation Act in May 2005 set the stage for a truth commis-
sion. The Liberian TRC was inaugurated on February 20, 2006. After many delays, a 
Secretariat commenced in March 2007, and public hearings began in January 2008. 
The general outline of the TRC’s mission was included in Part Six, Article XIII of 
the Accra Peace Accord of August 18, 2003.21 On May 12, 2005, the Liberian Tran-
sitional Legislative Assembly enacted the Truth and Reconciliation Commission Act, 
which established the Commission and defined its mandate. The Act stipulates that the 
TRC should “promote national peace, security, unity and reconciliation.” The TRC’s 
mandate includes the investigation of gross human rights violations, breaches of hu-
manitarian law, sexual offenses, and economic crimes during the period between Jan-
uary 1979 and October 2003. The Commission’s mandate stipulates that the TRC may 
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also explore the period before 1979. In addition, the Commission shall provide a forum 
against impunity, establish a record of the past, and compile a public report with find-
ings and recommendations.22 About a year after the start of public hearings, the first 
volume of the final report was released.23
The First Volume of the TRC’s Final Report
Volume I contains an analysis of the legal nature of the conflict, as well as a list of find-
ings and recommendations. The Commission has reserved the right to make addition-
al determinations in the final consolidated report. This decision leaves many thorny 
questions for the concluding two volumes. For instance, the TRC recommends “pros-
ecutions in a court of competent jurisdiction and other forms of public sanctions.”24 
The Commission has promised to issue a list of names of individuals not recommended 
for prosecution, as well as more detailed proposals on the nature of a criminal court. 
Unsurprisingly, the recommendation of prosecutions has attracted much attention 
and controversy.25 Ex-rebel leader Prince Johnson, now a Senator, threatened to cause 
trouble if anyone tried to arrest him.26 While Liberia has a history of impunity and 
failed peace agreements, the Accra peace agreement explicitly rejects impunity. In its 
preliminary report, the TRC recommends criminal prosecutions, although without 
specifying for whom or for which crimes. The prospects of criminal prosecutions have 
led to heated debates. 
Other notable aspects of the report’s first volume, including some very positive fea-
tures, also deserve to be mentioned. Apart from formal prosecutions, the commission 
also called for the establishment of a National Palava Hut Forum as a complementary 
tool for justice and national reconciliation. The Palava Hut process is a traditional 
dispute resolution mechanism.27 The TRC suggested that this forum would operate 
under the aegis of the Independent Human Rights Commission. The TRC will submit a 
comprehensive recommendation on the competence, jurisdiction, structure, function, 
and other authority of the Palava Hut Forum to the legislature in the second volume 
of the report.28 Furthermore, the TRC suggested that reparations should apply to com-
munities and individuals. Amnesties should be granted for children and for those who 
admit their wrongs and express remorse.
Another positive aspect of Volume I is that the Commission clearly explains its 
methodology, structure, the key actors involved in its work, and its interpretation of its 
mandate. Volume I provides an outline of challenges the TRC has faced, especially in 
the beginning its operations. In addition, it is notable that the Commission did not nar-
row its analysis to the period of January 1979 to October 2003. The Truth and Recon-
ciliation Act allowed the Commission to include “any other period preceding 1979,”29 
and the TRC has taken full advantage of this clause. The report’s analysis of the causes 
of Liberia’s conflict begins in 1822, the year in which Americo-Liberians began set-
tling in Liberia. The commission states that “[o]ne of the major historical and fester-
ing antecedents to conflict in Liberia was the enormously disparate socio-political and 
cultural norms and practices of the Americo-Liberians, who began settling in Liberia 
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in 1822, and indigenous Liberians, also known as the natives, comprised of sixteen 
ethno-linguistic groups. Another complex dynamic was the nature of wars between 
native Liberian groups that reached an apex during the period of the infamous Trans-
Atlantic Slave Trade.”30 The Commission notes that the historical antecedents of con-
flict are “far more complicated than Black Colonial paradigm machinations,” and the 
relationship between settlers and natives was wrought with misconceptions, fear, and 
conflict.31
The TRC then outlines the stages of the past conflicts. In order to determine wheth-
er international humanitarian law applied at a given time, the Commission concludes 
that non-international armed conflicts (civil wars) existed between December 1989 and 
August 1996, and between March 1999 and October 14, 2003.32 The report lists parties 
to the conflict and divides them into “significant violator groups” and “less significant 
violator groups,” according to the number of reported violations.33 The most notorious 
among the “significant violator groups” are Charles Taylor’s National Patriotic Front of 
Liberia (NPFL) and the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD), 
who fought against Taylor’s regime.34 
The TRC then lists its main findings and recommendations:
Findings
The root causes of the conflict are attributable to poverty; greed; corruption; • 
limited access to education; economic, social, civil, and political inequalities; 
identity conflict; and land tenure and distribution.
All factions are responsible for egregious violations of domestic law and inter-• 
national human rights and humanitarian law. 
All factions committed gender-based violence and conscripted child soldiers.• 
External state actors in Africa, North America, and Europe aided and abetted • 
war and regime change.35 
Recommendations
Prosecutions in a court of competent jurisdiction and the establishment of a • 
National Palava Hut Forum.
Reparations for communities and individuals, especially women and chil-• 
dren.
General amnesty for children and those that the Commission has determined • 
have not committed gross violations.
Other amnesties, in the interest of national healing and reconciliation, if indi-• 
viduals admit their wrongs and express remorse. 
Reform of public institutions to promote good governance and human rights, • 
to reduce poverty, to alleviate illiteracy, and to provide equal access to public 
services.36 
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Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights: 
Gaps in Volume I of the Final Report 
Liberia’s TRC is one of only a handful of transi-
tional justice mechanisms that have engaged with 
violations of ESCR.37 While a few transitional jus-
tice mechanisms have investigated ESCR, they have 
largely failed to propose measures to redress the 
documented violations. For instance, the Commis-
sion for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation in East 
Timor has documented violations of ESCR in detail; 
however, when it came to define who was a victim 
deserving reparations, the Commission limited itself 
to victims of civil and political rights out of “feasibil-
ity and needs-based prioritization.”38 In this respect, 
Nepal is another case in point. Tafadzwa Pasipano-
dya argues that while the Nepalese peace agreement 
reflects a deep commitment to address ESCR viola-
tions as both a cause and result of Nepal’s conflict, the international community and 
the Nepalese government have so far not effectively sought to include ESCR violations 
in the transitional justice strategy.39 By focusing on civil and political rights, she argues, 
international agencies have sidelined the fact that violations of ESCR were as pervasive 
as violations of civil and political rights. In addition, Pasipanodya shows how a narrow 
perspective fails to capture the subtle gender dimensions of the conflict and structural 
inequalities suffered by women and other vulnerable groups.40
Volume I of the Liberian TRC report is plagued by a similar lack of consideration of 
past ESCR violations. Despite the Commission’s conclusions on the causes of conflict, 
the Commission’s legal analysis of abuses is detached from its findings concerning the 
socio-economic causes of civil war. Strikingly, the TRC enumerates a somewhat arbi-
trary list of what it considered gross violations of human rights. The list includes mur-
der, extermination, enslavement, torture, rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, 
enforced sterilization, sexual violence, enforced disappearance, persecution, deporta-
tion or forcible transfer of population, imprisonment, genocide, and crimes against 
humanity.41
The TRC is correct in stating that the TRC Act encompasses these violations by 
referring to gross violations of human rights. The Commission does not, however, of-
fer an explanation as to why other violations are not included, and it fails to explain 
the criteria used to establish this list. While the concept of “gross violations of human 
rights” is not clearly defined by international law, there is no reason to limit the scope 
of the term to civil and political rights. A study by the UN’s Special Rapporteur on the 
Right to Reparation to Victims of Gross Violations of Human Rights confirms that the 
term may extend to ESCR.42 The discriminative deprival of access to basic means of 
survival and the destruction of housing and food stocks all arguably constitute “gross 
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violations of human rights.” One could, for instance, mention the widespread econom-
ic and social exploitation of forcibly recruited children, which is also excluded from the 
Commission’s list of gross violations.43
The report is unclear as to what weight the Commission grants to violations of 
ESCR. The report states, “[t]he TRC Act is almost exclusively concerned with gross vio-
lations of civil and political rights to include economic, social, and cultural rights, with 
explicit reference to economic crimes.”44 This vague statement is not further discussed. 
Whether the term “almost exclusively” indicates a prioritization of civil and political 
rights over ESCR is left open to interpretation. 
In addition, the Commission neglects the opportunity to address violations com-
mitted by private citizens against private citizens. The Commission implicitly argues 
that these violations were unregulated under international human rights law, except 
with regard to very limited gross human rights violations.45 The report suggests that 
in the absence of armed conflict, when only human rights law applies (as opposed to 
when international humanitarian law and human rights law apply concurrently), only 
violations committed by the state against private citizens can be addressed. This view 
ignores the state’s obligations of due diligence, which apply to all human rights. States 
must prevent and control abusive behavior of non-state actors and take steps to fulfill 
the human rights contained in the international Bill of Rights.46 As a result of its failure 
to take into account how the human rights law framework pertains to non-state actors, 
the Commission does not fully explore the legal norms on ESCR. Instead of confin-
ing itself to the term “economic crimes,” the Commission should look at ESCR more 
broadly under international human rights law and under international humanitarian 
law. This approach would mitigate the gap between the Commission’s findings on the 
main causes of the conflict and its legal analysis of abuses.
Currently, the recommendation for reparations is a mere sentence long and sug-
gests that the TRC considers individual and community reparations that are “desirable 
and appropriate.”47 As it stands now, the recommendations made in the preliminary 
report do not refer to violations of ESCR. Thus, as it continues its work, the Commis-
sion must issue more detailed recommendations for how to prevent the recurrence of 
abuses and on reparations for the full range of abuses, including violations of ESCR. 
In short, the first volume of the report of the Liberian TRC exemplifies the tenden-
cy of transitional justice processes to marginalize ESCR. At the same time, the ongoing 
transitional justice experience of Liberia illustrates two arguments for abandoning this 
conceptual blind spot. First, international law obliges this action, and the Act establish-
ing the Liberian TRC mandates the Commission to address violations of ESCR. Second, 
there are sound policy reasons to include ESCR in a transitional justice strategy.
The Legal Argument for Including ESCR 
There is a straightforward legal argument to support the inclusion of ESCR in the Li-
berian TRC report. The Act establishing the Commission refers to all gross human 
rights violations. As mentioned, there is little reason that gross human rights viola-
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tions should be limited to civil and political rights. The UN Rapporteur on the Right to 
Reparation to Victims of Gross Violations of Human Rights, who drafted the UN Basic 
Principles on the Right to a Remedy, affirms this view.48 Moreover, Liberia is a state 
party to the ICESCR and is therefore bound by the legal obligations contained in the 
Covenant.49 While the Covenant demands the “progressive realization” of the rights 
contained therein, some obligations are immediate and independent of resource con-
siderations. First, every State party must take concrete steps to realize ESCR. Second, 
the obligation of non-discrimination is always binding on State parties.50 For example, 
if women face disproportionate economic insecurity because their access to primary 
means of economic production is dependent on a land-owning male, the State of Libe-
ria faces an immediate legal obligation to take steps to address the situation. 
The Truth Commission has an opportunity to examine questions of discrimination 
based on an analysis of existing inequalities, and to make concrete recommendations 
for redress. Ideally, this would help the Liberian State comply with its obligation to 
remedy past abuses. International human rights law demands that States provide a 
remedy for violations of rights contained in both human rights covenants. This can 
take the form of restitution, compensation, or satisfaction. They can be granted to in-
dividuals or to groups and they may include material as well as symbolic components. 
While States are granted considerable flexibility in how to provide remedies, the right 
to a remedy is not an exclusive domain of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.51 
Apart from a human rights law framework, violations of ESCR may fall under in-
ternational humanitarian law in some circumstances. The Statute of the International 
Criminal Court (ICC) recognizes the appropriation of property, pillage, and starvation 
as war crimes.52 The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia held 
that the destruction of homes and property was a crime against humanity if the neces-
sary intent (mens rea) could be proven.53 In the domestic realm, the Accra peace agree-
ment, as well as the Liberian Constitution, include concerns about ESCR and the socio-
economic well-being of Liberians.54 By virtue of the TRC’s mandate and victims’ right 
to a remedy, the Liberian Truth Commission must address ESCR in a more profound 
manner than what is currently included in the first volume of its report.
Policy Arguments
Ensuring Sustainability and Increasing Human Security
The central policy argument for TRC engagement with ESCR violations is sustainabil-
ity. Whether it be “sustainable peace-building” or “post-conflict conflict prevention,” 
practitioners have argued that “gains could be unmade if the conditions that led to or 
aggravated repression and conflict are left to fester, allowing repression to reemerge 
and conflict to recur.”55 Mike McGovern, a political anthropologist who works in West 
Africa, argues that many post-conflict strategies fail to tackle underlying causes and 
conflict dynamics, and instead focus too narrowly on what he calls “technocratic fixes.” 
McGovern argues that without looking at the motivations of the corrupt and the violent 
(two groups who are often one and the same) long-term positive change cannot be as-
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sured.56 The nexus between wealth and power is increasingly seen as crucial to under-
standing incentives to forge a viable peace and to create an environment conducive to 
human security and human rights. 
Peace will rarely be sustainable if the political-
economic incentives for conflict are overlooked, and 
large groups of the population remain economically 
or socially marginalized. In Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s 
words, sustainable peace can only be achieved when 
the “pervasive and deep sources of conflict” have 
been addressed by enhancing respect for human 
rights and promoting sustainable economic and so-
cial development.57 Proponents of human security 
agree that violent threats to individuals are strongly 
associated with poverty, lack of state capacity, and 
socio-economic and political inequities.58 Whether 
economic and social dynamics were the main cause 
of the conflict, as the Liberian TRC suggests in its 
report, or they were “only” fuelling it, is largely ir-
relevant. In assessing the human security concerns 
of Liberians, it is safe to conclude that grievances in 
Liberia’s post-conflict society relate to economic and social rights (access to food, wa-
ter, healthcare, land, or adequate housing), as well as to civil and political rights. 
Ruben Carranza of the International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ) adds 
another sustainability argument to why including ESCR in transitional justice strate-
gies is important. He analyzes the intersection of human rights and economic crimes, 
and shows how the failure to address accountability for economic crimes reinforces 
impunity for all abuses, including those relating to civil and political rights. He ex-
plains that by violating the economic rights of others, perpetrators often amass finan-
cial resources, which help shield them and their allies from accountability after the 
transition. As an example, he mentions the Abacha family, who use illegally acquired 
assets to maintain influence in Nigerian politics and to preserve the impunity of those 
who could still be held accountable.59 According to Carranza, Charles Taylor uses his 
fortune in his efforts to intimidate prosecution witnesses appearing in the Special 
Court for Sierra Leone and in influencing members of the Liberian legislature to defeat 
proposed laws that would have frozen his assets.60 
Additionally, Carranza explains how systematically dealing with ESCR and eco-
nomic crimes could contribute to recovering illegally amassed financial assets, which 
could be used to fund reparations programs. Partial solutions have been found in Peru, 
where a special fund was created to govern the use of assets confiscated from Fuji-
mori and his associates. Under this law, recovered assets have been used for both anti-
corruption and reparations programs.61 At the international level, a first step in this 
direction was the creation of the ICC’s trust fund for victims. The ICC statute allows 
Peace will rarely 
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the Court to freeze assets of convicted individuals if they amassed assets through the 
commission of crimes for which they are held guilty.62 It remains to be seen whether 
this mechanism will help change the unsuccessful efforts to recover funds from perpe-
trators. 
Missing Gender Dimensions
The lack of in-depth analysis of violations of ESCR may also have serious negative 
repercussions for the understanding of abuses suffered by women and girls. Violence 
against women is an important part of both the Commission’s mandate and report. 
The TRC was tasked with analyzing violence against women for good reason. Sexual 
violence was undoubtedly one of the most horrific aspects of Liberia’s conflict, and 
unfortunately has not ceased since the end of the conflict.63 In one part of the report, 
the TRC explicitly states that women’s experiences are often not reported or under-
reported for “historical, cultural, social, political, economic, and other reasons.”64 As 
a consequence, the TRC established a gender committee, guidelines for the treatment 
of women in the TRC process, and special hearings with women’s groups.65 Neverthe-
less, the diagnosis on the underreporting of women’s experiences does not seem to 
have fundamentally affected the TRC’s analysis of the range of past abuses, and gender 
questions are compartmentalized from the discussion of other problems. 
The underlying assumption is that when women 
suffered, it was necessarily from direct sexual vio-
lence (gang rape, sexual slavery, torture, etc.).66 This 
approach is problematic because it glosses over the 
more subtle and structural gender dimensions of the 
conflict. By narrowly conceptualizing harm suffered 
by women as only relating to direct sexual violence, 
the Commission deals exclusively with the civil and 
political dimensions of women’s rights violations. 
The TRC diagnoses issues such as limited access to 
education or land tenure as a root cause of conflict. 
However, it fails to discuss the economic, social, 
and cultural dimensions of human rights violations; 
and those of women in particular. For instance, the 
preliminary report does not contain a discussion of 
whether the diagnosed causes of the conflict have af-
fected women or other groups disproportionally. By 
only looking at direct sexual violence and failing to 
analyze other abuses suffered by women, the Commission concludes that, “as a group, 
men comprise a larger victim category than women.”67
Mats Utas, a cultural anthropologist focusing on West Africa, has studied the con-
nections between sexual violence and ensuing violations of economic and social rights 
suffered by survivors. He shows that those who have suffered from sexual violence in 
By narrowly 
conceptualizing 
harm suffered by 
women as only 
relating to direct 
sexual violence, the 
Commission deals 
exclusively with the 
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Liberia have developed unique survival strategies to deal with the violation of their 
civil and political rights (e.g. the instances of rape), as well as tactics to cope with the 
daily economic and social consequences of those violations. Sexual violence did not 
merely affect women in civil and political ways. For instance, sexual violence may lead 
to extreme poverty or social rejection, and state healthcare might not cover the physi-
cal and mental damage that results from sexual violence.68 Implicitly assuming that all 
harm suffered by women necessarily relates to forms of direct sexual violence is very 
limiting. Moreover, such an approach risks cementing ideas of women’s inequality by 
addressing their plight only from a narrow perspective of one type of rights violation. 
Systematic attention to violations of ESCR and to other economic dimensions of 
a civil conflict has the potential to address the root causes of many conflicts in a more 
meaningful way. In sum, the inclusion of these considerations in transitional justice 
strategies would reveal complex gender dimensions of the past conflict, could enhance 
the fight against impunity, and may contribute to the provision of financial means for 
reparations programs. While legal and policy arguments have been identified for ad-
dressing ESCR in transitional justice, a number of challenges must be addressed. There 
are no simple solutions to this problem.
Challenges to the Inclusion of ESCR in 
Transitional Justice Strategies
There are three challenges to the inclusion of ESCR in transitional justice strategies. 
First, armed conflicts and other violent situations lead to circumstances in which nu-
merous competing demands must be addressed while resources fall chronically short 
of needs. Moreover, efforts to address past violence often take place in fragile political 
environments. Those who push for accountability and redress for violations of ESCR 
face economically and politically powerful actors and are moreover often confronted 
with very high expectations of victims and society. While there is no fundamental ob-
stacle to applying the key elements of transitional justice to violations of ESCR or to 
large-scale corruption and economic crime, there is also no simple solution to deal 
with the manifold limitations to the capacity of a transitional justice strategy. In Rama 
Mani’s words, “[w]hen patterns of social injustice are so wide, their victims so many, 
their impact and consequences so far-ranging for the individuals and communities it 
is difficult at first glance to envisage how to encompass them within the finite range of 
the targeted measures of transitional justice.”69 Writing as the guest editor of the Inter-
national Journal of Transitional Justice, she points out that “it is well known that the 
mandates of existing transitional justice mechanisms are already overcharged, their 
responsibilities too heavy, public expectations too unrealistic and finances already too 
lean.”70 
At the same time, the challenges of competing demands, resource constraints, and 
high expectations are not unique to the inclusion of ESCR into transitional justice work 
in Liberia and elsewhere. Establishing a reparations program for torture victims or 
conducting criminal investigations for any human rights abuses are equally likely to 
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demand creative solutions and tenacious work. Sure-
ly, transitional justice alone is not a panacea for the 
complex problems of a post-conflict country. Never-
theless, as Carranza’s research shows, the benefits 
of including ESCR in the mandates of transitional 
justice mechanisms are considerable. The account of 
the past will be more complete when ordinary people 
feel that the root causes of the conflict relate to eco-
nomic and social exclusion. Reparations programs 
may be far more relevant to victims if they address 
the full range of abuses. The inclusion of economic 
crime into transitional justice could harness resourc-
es for repatriations and eliminate the ability of per-
petrators to live with impunity.71
The second challenge is the further time and ef-
fort required to discourage the division of human 
rights into two disparate discourses. Those who 
believe that there are fundamental differences between civil and political rights and 
ESCR argue that the realization of ESCR, whether in situations of transition or not, is 
expensive and burdensome. While this is largely true, rule of law practitioners involved 
in reforming justice systems generally agree that guaranteeing due process rights, a 
classic civil and political right, equally requires financial resources and continuous ef-
forts from the State. Advocates of the inclusion of ESCR in transitional justice will have 
to continue their efforts to convince governments, donors, scholars, and practitioners 
that the compartmentalization of human rights is not only unsound, but also unhelp-
ful. 
Third, one of the most difficult challenges concerns how reparations programs–
whether material, symbolic, individual, collective, or a combination of these–can be 
designed to meaningfully address past or ongoing violations of ESCR. For example, 
there is a complicated relationship between collective reparations and development. 
If reparations too closely resemble development measures, survivors may feel the gov-
ernment is insufficiently responsive to individual violations. They may feel that the 
government is not addressing past abuses, but instead fulfilling pre-existing obliga-
tions to promote development.72 Designing a reparations plan that addresses the full 
range of past human rights violations while satisfying the expectations of victims is an 
extraordinary–but decisive–challenge of transitional justice. 
Areas for Further Research
Before recommending how the Liberian TRC could tackle some of the problems men-
tioned in this article, two other concerns should be targeted for further research. First, 
cultural rights remain severely understudied, having failed to attract the attention of 
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scholars and practitioners alike.73 The second point, which is even more complicated, 
is that debates on ESCR and on economic crime and grand corruption are overlapping, 
but not congruent. ESCR are both broader and narrower than the concept of economic 
crime. ESCR are broader in the sense that they encompass far more than concerns of 
corruption and economic fraud. At the same time, the debate on ESCR is narrower in 
the sense that not every instance of economic crime is necessarily a violation of inter-
national human rights norms. For instance, a private individual falsifying company 
records may be committing an economic crime, but the same act would not constitute 
a human rights violation. As the transitional justice movement begins to address the 
marginalization of ESCR, the intersections between ESCR and economic crime must 
be addressed. This demarcation is important because of its legal consequences. 
Understanding the distinction between ESCR and economic crime is important 
to avoid confusion that might reinforce misconceptions about ESCR and provide am-
munition to those who argue that ESCR are not “real” human rights. The December 
2008 issue of the International Journal of Transitional Justice demonstrates that this 
demarcation remains unclear. For instance, Carranza mentions in his article that one 
of the main arguments against including ESCR in transitional justice was “that bring-
ing in a nonhuman rights component could become a distraction in the work, for in-
stance, of a truth commission.”74 However, once we have determined which instances 
of economic crime and corruption concern ESCR–and are hence part of the human 
rights framework–these would not constitute a “nonhuman rights” component of tran-
sitional justice.75 Similarly, Mani recommends that “the frontiers of transitional jus-
tice must be stretched.”76 By conceiving the inclusion of ESCR as a new component of 
transitional justice, proponents of ESCR inclusion risk confirming the narrow view of 
what constitutes human rights violations. Dealing with ESCR is therefore not a “tran-
sitional-justice-plus” approach. Rather, it allows for a more complete understanding 
of human rights violations and for a full exploration of the existing human rights law 
framework. Incorporating ESCR violations makes the rhetoric of the indivisibility and 
interrelatedness of rights a reality. As mentioned in previous sections, this is not a 
simple task. Nevertheless, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Liberia should 
take into account a few additional points when it finalizes its consolidated report.
Concluding Notes and Recommendations 
for the Consolidated Report 
The TRC has promised that the additional volumes of its final report will present a 
more detailed analysis of the causes of the conflict.77 The Commission has also an-
nounced that the final report will describe specific crimes committed by perpetrators, 
report findings on individual and group responsibility, and outline more detailed rec-
ommendations.78 The Commission has an opportunity to elaborate on its views and 
to bridge the current gap between the TRC’s findings on the causes of conflict with its 
legal analysis in the final report. In order to address this disconnect, the remaining two 
volumes of the TRC should address the following:
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The TRC should expand its definition of “gross human rights violations” to 
include ESCR and should analyze violations of ESCR.
As with all post-conflict interventions, the voices of the affected population should be 
heard. If few people believe that a prosecutorial mechanism for addressing only viola-
tions of civil and political rights will remedy harm suffered,79 seeking creative ways 
to address the full range of abuses seems only reasonable. As a first step, the TRC 
should complete its list of “gross human rights violations” with the inclusion of gross 
violations of ESCR. The commission could then examine the violations of ESCR un-
der both international humanitarian and human rights law. This would allow the TRC 
to include a detailed analysis of how the most widespread ESCR violations affected 
individual victims and their communities. Particular attention should be paid to the 
relationship between ESCR and civil and political rights abuses, as well as their impact 
on vulnerable groups. 
The Commission should insist that reparations are necessary as a matter of 
law and that they should extend to all gross human rights violations.
As it currently stands, the recommendations of the commission are vague, especially 
with respect to reparations. While the Commission recognizes that “reparation is a 
desirable and appropriate mechanism to redress the violations of human rights,”80 
it fails to acknowledge that the state of Liberia is obligated to provide them as a mat-
ter of international law.81 The TRC should correct this omission and clearly state that 
Liberia has legal obligations to provide reparations for harm suffered. The UN Basic 
Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of 
Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of Inter-
national Humanitarian Law recognize that reparations can take many forms, including 
financial and symbolic compensation.82 Human rights law clearly supports the idea 
that the right to reparation exists for all violations of gross human rights, including 
ESCR. While reparations programs are never easily designed and implemented, the 
TRC is the most legitimate body to make specific recommendations for how to remedy 
past abuses. 
The Commission should take into account experiences and best practices
from other countries.
Undoubtedly, designing an adequate and feasible reparations program for Liberia will 
be challenging. Research on this problem was conducted by the Liberian civil society 
Transitional Justice Working Group in early 2004. More than 1,007 people were in-
terviewed, and the vast majority of respondents said that they had a family member 
killed, were victims of abuse, had property destroyed or looted, or had to relocate from 
one place to another, sometimes more than twice.83 Experiences with collective and in-
dividual reparations programs in Sierra Leone, Morocco, and Peru may offer valuable 
insight to Liberia’s TRC. Experts and members of civil society from these countries 
could provide helpful advice. They could identify best practices based on experiences 
in various countries, and may also be able to anticipate the challenges of designing 
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and implementing reparations programs that include violations of ESCR. Peru, for in-
stance, provides for one of the few existing attempts to include ESCR dimensions in a 
reparations program. 
The TRC and its supporters should ensure widespread and meaningful 
dissemination of the Commission’s findings and recommendations.
It is unlikely that many Liberians have been able to access the preliminary report, es-
pecially in light of the fact that the report was removed from the Commission’s website. 
Once the final consolidated report is released, the act establishing the TRC requires 
the Commission to submit it to the National Legislature and to publish its key find-
ings in at least three local newspapers.84 Hopefully this provision will ensure extensive 
dissemination of the report. At the same time, considerations of how to present the 
account of the past may facilitate the dissemination of the Commission’s findings and 
recommendations.
The first volume of the final report takes a very 
legalistic approach, even if the Commission states 
that it is “not a court or tribunal.”85 Volume I presents 
the past abuses in a “faceless” way, without including 
individual accounts or descriptions of specific viola-
tions. The Commission started with an in-depth legal 
analysis of the vast time span covered by its mandate 
in order to lay the groundwork on which to assess 
what body of law applied at a given moment. The final 
report should take advantage of this groundwork, and 
the Commission should apply its legal conclusions to 
specific violations. Compared to reports of other truth 
commissions, the first volume is silent about the con-
crete experiences of the population during the years 
of violent conflict. This begs the question of the extent 
to which it will resonate with ordinary Liberians. The 
consolidated version should give those who testified 
a voice in the final report, using the statements, videos, photographs, and drawings it 
amassed during its investigation. Including some of this material—with the consent of 
those concerned and adhering to agreements of confidentiality—might help make the 
report more accessible and relevant to ordinary citizens.
In order to disseminate its findings in a more effective manner, the Liberian TRC 
could follow the example of the Sierra Leonean TRC and produce illustrated versions 
of its report for young children and for students.86 WITNESS, an international NGO, 
was invited by the Sierra Leonean TRC to produce a video accompaniment to the offi-
cial report. The objective of the video was to raise public awareness of the TRC’s peace-
building efforts throughout the country, and to encourage civil society to hold the gov-
ernment accountable for implementing the TRC’s recommendations.87 
The consolidated 
version should 
give those who 
testified a voice 
in the final 
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The TRC should recommend that Liberia Ratifies the Optional Protocol to the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).
Finally, the TRC should recommend that Liberia ratifies the Optional Protocol (OP) to 
the ICESCR. On December 10, 2008, the UN General Assembly unanimously adopted 
a facultative protocol to the Covenant on ESCR. Once entered into force, the proto-
col will under certain circumstances allow individuals and groups of victims to access 
the independent expert committee supervising the implementation of the Covenant.88 
While the legal obligations of the Covenant exist for all state parties to the treaty, the 
OP would allow the committee to develop case law, which could contribute to the real-
ization of ESCR protection at the national level. 
While the Liberian TRC deepens its analysis of ESCR in its consolidated report, it 
could lay the groundwork for Liberian civil society to continue the endeavor to enhance 
protection for all human rights. The Act establishing the Liberian TRC foresees that the 
Independent National Human Rights Commission of Liberia 
shall be seized with the responsibility to ensure that all the recommendations 
contained in the Report of the TRC are implemented, and that civil society or-
ganizations and moral guarantors of the CPA [Comprehensive Peace Agree-
ment] shall have the responsibility to monitor and campaign for the scrupu-
lous implementation of all recommendations contained in the report.89
The ratification of the Optional Protocol could be a tool for both the civil society and 
the Independent National Human Rights Commission to hold the government ac-
countable for implementing the obligations of the ICESCR. 
The Liberian TRC has an exceptionally broad mandate which includes ESCR and 
economic crimes. It remains to be seen if this promising feature will be fully explored 
in the final consolidated report. The Liberian TRC should use the upcoming report to 
ensure that its recommendations are in line with its diagnosis that the root causes of 
conflict are linked to violations of ESCR. In doing so, the TRC should insist on the cen-
trality of economic, social, and cultural rights for the dignity of each person as well as 
the idea that all human rights are indivisible, interdependent, and interrelated.
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